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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
SCOTT BOWMAN, : Case No. 960372-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
INTRODUCTION 
Appellant maintains that the trial court erred by 
concluding that the prosecutor's strikes against Mrs. Alires, and 
My Dang were not purposefully discriminatory. The prosecutor 
struck Mrs. Alires because he claimed he had prosecuted another 
person with the same last name who had stolen glasses from an 
optician shop and given them to family members. He claimed he 
believed Mrs. Alires might be related to that individual despite 
the fact that on her questionnaire she indicated that she did not 
have any relatives who had been prosecuted for crimes. R. 367-
69. The prosecutor also struck Ms. Dang, a woman of Asian 
descent, on the grounds that after listening to her verbal 
responses to the court's questions she did not appear to have a 
sufficient command of the English language. R. 3 67. The 
prosecutor never individually questioned either woman. Appellant 
also challenges the court's ruling allowing the prosecutor to 
comment on rebuttal during closing argument on Appellant's 
failure to call a key State's witness. During closing argument, 
defense counsel argued that the State had failed to prove its 
case beyond a reasonable doubt in part because it did not call to 
the stand Mitchell, the man who initially identified Appellant as 
the driver of the motorcycle. R. 272-74. In response, the 
prosecutor argued that defense counsel should have called the 
witness himself. After defense counsel's objection was 
overruled, the prosecutor repeated his remark to the jury. R. 
272-74. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PROSECUTOR'S STRIKES AGAINST TWO OF THREE 
MINORITY JURY PANELISTS WERE RACIALLY MOTIVATED. 
A. Standard of Review 
The State claims Appellant has failed to establish that 
the prosecutor's strikes against Ms. Dang and Mrs. Alires were 
discriminatory. The State begins by disputing Appellant's 
assertion that this case presents a mixed question of law and 
fact on review. The State cites Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 
352, 365, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1869 (1991) for the proposition that 
Batson challenges are highly fact sensitive because the decisive 
question will be whether the prosecutor's race-neutral 
explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed. Since 
there is seldom much evidence other than the demeanor of the 
attorney who struck the jurors, the trial court's findings are 
entitled to great deference. See State's Brief, pg. 17-18. 
This case, however, is different than the typical Batson 
challenge because the determination of whether the prosecutor's 
explanation was a pretext for discrimination does not turn 
exclusively on the trial court's assessment of his demeanor. 
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The issue in this case is whether the prosecutor's explanations 
for striking Ms. Dang and Mrs. Alires are supported by the record 
or whether those explanations are impermissible pretexts for 
discrimination. State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454, 464 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993). The record in this case includes Mrs. Alires' jury 
questionnaire and the video tape of the voir dire proceedings.1 
Because the video tape is part of the record, this Court 
stands in the same position as the trial court. This case is 
similar to Miranda cases where the trial court reviews the 
transcript of the interrogation. In those cases, there are 
essentially no undisputed facts so the trial court's application 
of the facts to the law are reviewed under a correction of error 
standard. State v. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894, 898 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993); State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1103 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) . The rationale for granting the trial court broad 
deference simply does not apply in this case. 
Though Batson challenges are generally the type of claim 
where the trial court is given wide latitude, it is the role of 
the appellate courts to develop the law to provide direction to 
those whose responsibility it is to enforce it. State v. 
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993). This Court should not 
accept the State's invitation to abdicate any meaningful review 
of Batson claims under the guise of deference to the trial court. 
1
. Both the State and Appellant have urged this Court to 
review the video tape of the proceedings in making its 
determination of Appellant's Batson claim. See, State's Brief, pg. 
27, and Appellant's Opening Brief, pg. 30. 
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As a matter of law, a prosecutor should not be permitted to 
strike a minority juror based on a justification that does not 
appear on the record to be true. 
If any explanation, no matter how insubstantial 
and no matter how great its disparate impact, 
could rebut a prima facie inference of 
discrimination provided only that the explanation 
itself was not facially discriminatory, "the 
Equal Protection Clause 'would be a vain and 
illusory requirement.'" 
Hernandez, 111 S.Ct. at 1876, 500 U.S. at 376 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting.) 
The State would have this Court limit its review of the 
"credibility" of the prosecutor to a determination of whether he 
was lying to the trial court. The State misunderstands the 
requirement that the defendant demonstrate purposeful 
discrimination. The State appears to equate an evil intent with 
purposeful discrimination. The State then argues that if the 
trial court believed the prosecutor was "credible," judicial 
review on appeal is foreclosed. See State's Brief, pat. 17-19. 
Batson was intended to safeguard against discrimination in all 
its forms, both subtle and overt. Racial prejudice "stems from 
various causes and may manifest itself in different forms." 
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 416, 113 L.Ed.2d 411, 429, 111 
S.Ct. 1364 (1991). For example, if a prosecutor justified 
striking all the African American people from the jury on the 
grounds that they did not appear to be intelligent enough to 
understand a complex white collar crime case, Batson would compel 
reversal even if the trial court found that the prosecutor truly 
4 
believed that his grounds for striking the jurors were not 
consciously race motivated. The strikes would nonetheless be 
based upon an impermissible racial stereotype. 
Batson protects the integrity of the judicial system 
against a prosecutor who strikes an Hispanic juror because he 
hates Hispanics, as well as the prosecutor who strikes an 
Hispanic juror because despite reliable evidence to the contrary, 
he believes she is a liar and her relatives are thieves. The 
second prosecutor may have made his strike in "good faith," but 
the strike is nonetheless based on race. A prosecutor may in 
"good faith" believe that Hispanics are prone to misrepresent the 
truth, where it would not occur to him to question the veracity 
of the Caucasian jurors. A prosecutor may in "good faith" 
associate an Hispanic person with theft cases he is prosecuting, 
where he would not make that association with the Caucasian 
jurors on the panel.2 
The prosecutor in this case may have genuinely believed 
Mrs. Alires had lied because her relatives were thieves and had 
obtained stolen glasses for family members. The trial court may 
have believed the prosecutor acted in good faith. That finding 
does not end judicial review. For example, in State v. Cantu, 
778 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah 1989) ("Cantu II"), this prosecutor 
struck an Hispanic juror because he was angry at defense counsel 
2
. The prosecutor, in this case, did not associate any of the 
Caucasian jurors with common last names like Smith, Lawrence, or 
Jacobsen with criminal defendants he has prosecuted with the same 
name. 
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for insisting that Hispanics be impaneled on the jury. The court 
did not question his credibility when he insisted that he struck 
the juror out of anger. Nonetheless, the prosecutor's 
justification was found to be racially motivated and reversal was 
required. Id. 
B. The Prosecutor's Strike Against Mrs. Alires 
Was Racially Motivated. 
The State concedes that the prosecutor's failure to 
question Mrs. Alires is "somewhat compromising." However, the 
State then speculates that there may have been a myriad of 
legitimate reasons why the prosecutor failed to question Mrs. 
Alires. Ultimately, the failure to examine Mrs. Alires is a 
factor weighing against the State. Cantu II , 778 P.2d at 519. 
The State's attempts to justify the prosecutor's failure 
to question Mrs. Alires skirts the most troubling aspect of this 
case. The prosecutor gave an explanation for striking Mrs. 
Alires that is not simply unsupported by the record, but is in 
direct conflict with it. The State's attempts to create 
plausible explanations for the prosecutor's conduct are simply 
inadequate. The prosecutor knew that Mrs. Alires had stated 
under oath that she had no family members who had been prosecuted 
for a crime. R. 341. If he believed she was lying then this 
Court must ask why he did not question the veracity of any of the 
Caucasian jurors. If he believed she was telling the truth, 
then his explanation was merely a pretext for a hidden reason he 
did not wish to reveal to the trial court. 
The State attempts to avoid confronting this problem by 
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focusing on the prosecutor's claim he did not know Mrs. Alires 
was Hispanic or that Alires is an Hispanic surname. See State's 
Brief pg. 24-25. The prosecutor's claimed ignorance is as 
suspect as his explanation for striking Mrs. Alires. In Cantu 
II, this prosecutor along with defense counsel chose prospective 
jurors from a master list based on their Hispanic surnames. 778 
P.2d at 517. Not only does he appear to have some knowledge of 
Hispanic surnames, it seems unlikely that a prosecutor living in 
a city with a significant Hispanic minority population does not 
know that Alires is an Hispanic name. His claim is as persuasive 
as a claim that he did not know that Gonzales, Ramirez, or 
Alvarez are Hispanic names would be. 
Contrary to the State's assertion, the trial court's 
ruling supports Appellant's claim that it was apparent that Mrs. 
Alires was of Hispanic descent. As part of its ruling, the 
trial court noted the presence of another minority member on the 
panel. R. 3 69. The court clearly based its ruling in part on 
the racial composition of the panel. Since the racial makeup of 
the panel was part of the court's basis for ruling against 
Appellant, one can safely assume that the court would have also 
noted the racial identity of Mrs. Alires had she not appeared to 
be Hispanic. The trial court's ruling accepts defense counsel's 
assertion that Mrs. Alires appeared to be of Hispanic descent. 
R. 367. 
Lastly, the State relies on State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 
769 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) for the proposition that even if the 
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prosecutor's justification is deemed inadequate the court is not 
compelled to find clear error. See State's Brief, pg. 24-25. In 
light of recent United States Supreme Court opinions, Harrison 
has questionable precedential value. In Harrison, the prosecutor 
justified striking two Hispanic women because of their gender, 
and that "for whatever reason" he liked them less than the other 
female jurors. Id. at 778. The court held that the prosecutor's 
response was not race-neutral and amounted to no more than an 
unsupported denial of racial discrimination. Jd. Despite the 
failure of the prosecutor to give a legally sufficient response, 
the court held that the trial court's finding of no purposeful 
discrimination was not clearly erroneous. Id. 
In J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 128 L.Ed.2d 89, 114 
S.Ct. 1419 (1994) the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause 
forbids striking a potential juror from the panel because of 
gender. Thus J.E.B. has effectively overruled the result in 
Harrison. More importantly, Harrison's analysis is questionable 
under Purkett v. Elem, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995). 
Elem held that after the defendant has established a prima facie 
case of discrimination the "burden of production shifts to the 
proponent of the strike to come forward with a race-neutral 
explanation. If. a race neutral explanation is tendered, the 
trial court must then decide whether the opponent of the strike 
has proved purposeful racial discrimination." 115 S.Ct. at 1771 
(emphasis added). 
The prosecutor cannot "satisfy his burden of production by merely 
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denying that he had a discriminatory motive or by merely 
affirming his good faith." Id. In Harrison, the State waived 
the issue of whether the defendant had established a prima facie 
case. 805 P.2d at 777. And under Elem, the State also failed as 
a matter of law to meet its burden of production. 115 S.Ct. at 
1771. Having failed to do both, under Elem the analysis would 
have ended. I 
C. Appellant Adequately Marshalled The Facts In 
Support Of His Claim That The Prosecutor's Strike 
Against Ms. Dang Was Racially Motivated. 
The State claims that Appellant failed to adequately 
I 
marshal the facts in support of his Batson challenge of the 
prosecutor's strike against Ms. Dang because he did not mention 
errors she made on her questionnaire. See, State's Brief, pg. 
19. While Ms. Dang did make a couple of errors on her 
questionnaire, her errors indicate more a confusion with the 
format of the form rather than an inability to understand 
English. More importantly, the questionnaire is irrelevant to 
the question of whether the prosecutor's explanation for striking 
Ms. Dang should be believed. When challenged for his strike of 
Ms. Dang the prosecutor stated: 
Judge, with respect to the -- Ms. Dang, when I 
heard her speak, I --I was concerned about the 
language problem. It had nothing to do with her 
race, I -- she said she's been here six years, 
and I -- when I listened, and I didn't want to 
embarrass her by probing into that, when I 
listened to her questions (sic), I thought, I'm 
not so sure that her command of the English 
language is what I would prefer; had nothing to 
do with her race. 
R. 368 (emphasis added). The prosecutor justified his strike of 
9 
Ms. Dang on her verbal responses to the trial court's questions, 
not her jury questionnaire. The focus of a Batson claim is on 
the prosecutor's stated justification for striking a minority 
person, not appellate counsel's explanations after the fact. 
D. The Lack Of Racial Similarity Between Mrs. 
Alires, Ms. Dang, and Appellant Is Not Relevant 
To His Claim That The Prosecutor's Strikes Were 
Racially Motivated. 
The State claims that the fact that Ms. Dang, Mrs. 
Alires, and Appellant are of different races undermines his 
Batson claim. See, State's Brief, pg. 25-26. The State's 
assertion contradicts Powers. 499 U.S. at 411, 113 L.Ed.2d at 
425.3 A lack of racial similarity is irrelevant to Appellant's 
Batson claim. Powers held that a defendant has third party 
standing to raise a Batson claim on behalf of a stricken minority 
jury. 499 U.S. at 416, 113 L.Ed.2d at 429. Powers also identified 
the defendant's interest in neutral jury selection procedures. 
3
. The State's reliance on Higginbotham, Hernandez, and 
Alvarez is misplaced. Hernandez and Alvarez are factually 
distinguishable. In both those cases, the inference of 
discrimination raised because the defendant and stricken jurors 
were Hispanic was undercut by the fact that the prosecution 
witnesses were also Hispanic. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 354, Alvarez, 
872 P.2d at 458. The court was simply pointing out in both cases 
that it would be illogical for the prosecutor to strike the jurors 
because he thought that racial similarity between them and the 
defendant would bias them towards the defense when his own 
witnesses would also benefit from any racially motivated bias. Id. 
These cases do not stand for the proposition that in all cases 
racial dissimilarity undercuts the defendant's Batson claim. 
Lastly, the State misstates the holding in State v. Higginbotham, 
917 P.2d 545 (Utah 1996) . In Higginbotham, the trial court relied 
on racial dissimilarity in rejecting the defendant's Batson 
challenge. Id. at 547. However, the Supreme Court did not cite 
this factor in upholding the trial court's ruling, but instead 
focused on the court's assessment of the prosecutor's credibility. 
Id. at 548. 
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The defendant has an interest "not because the individual jurors 
dismissed by the prosection may have been predisposed to favor 
the defendant; if that were true, the jurors might have been 
excused for cause. Rather, it is because racial discrimination 
in the selection of jurors casts doubt on the integrity of the 
judicial process and places the fairness of a criminal proceeding 
in doubt." 499 U.S. at 411, 113 L.Ed.2d at 425. 
The State misses the point of Powers when it argues that 
because the stricken jurors were of different races Appellant's 
claim is somehow diminished. Powers recognized that in some 
cases racial identity between the jurors and defendant might 
explain the prosecutor's discriminatory strike. But to assume 
that this is the only form racism takes in the courtroom is naive 
at best. The source and form of a prosecutor's bias may have 
nothing to do with the race of the defendant, and it may not be 
limited to only one racial group. 499 U.S. at 416, 113 L.Ed.2d 
at 429. More importantly, the harm suffered by both the 
stricken juror and the defendant is not related to any bias the 
juror may have held in favor of the defense. 499 U.S. at 411, 
113 L.Ed.2d at 425. | 
E. No Remand Is Required. 
The State argues that the trial court's ruling supports 
an implicit finding that the prosecutor appeared credible to the 
court, and in the alternative, that a remand is required to 
determine the race-neutrality of the prosecutor's strikes. See 
State's Brief, pg. 19. The trial court rejected Appellant's 
11 
claim on the following grounds: 
I think the case law makes fairly clear that the 
challenge at least has to pose (sic) race-neutral 
basis. It does not - - if I remember part of the 
words of the Court, it doesn't have to be a good 
reason, it simply has to be a neutral reason. I 
will note for the record as well that there is a 
person of obvious Indian descent who did remain 
and was not stricken. 
R. 369. The trial court appeared to have been singularly 
unimpressed with the prosecutor's justifications for striking the 
jurors, but felt that Appellant had not proved purposeful 
discrimination because the State had allowed one minority 
panelist to remain on the panel.4 Later in its brief, the 
State acknowledges that the trial court did rely on the 
prosecutor's not striking the last minority panelist in its 
ruling. See State's brief, pg. 27. The State also concedes that 
the court rejected this basis for upholding peremptory strikes 
against minorities in State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454, 465 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993). See also Cantu II, 750 P.2d at 597. On this 
point, Pharris and Cantu are indistinguishable from this case. 
Utah courts have long recognized that to hold otherwise would 
send a message that discriminatory strikes against minority jury 
panelists are tolerable as long as held to an "acceptable level." 
Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1728, 476 U.S. 79, 106 
(1986) . 
This is not to say that the trial court failed to make a 
4
. That panelist had ties to law enforcement, and had been 
struck for cause in defense counsel's prior trial because of that 
relationship. For those reasons, defense counsel struck the 
remaining minority panelist from the jury. R. 369-70. 
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finding on whether the prosecutor's justifications for striking 
the jurors were race neutral and a remand is required. Unlike 
the court in Pharris, the trial court in this case did make 
sufficient findings for review. The court's findings are not 
insufficient, they are simply not supported by the record. And 
the court's reliance on the fact that the prosecutor left a 
minority panelist on the jury was erroneous as a matter of law. 
See e.g. State v. Macial, 854 P.2d 543 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) . 
A review of Utah cases reveals that in only three cases 
the court has ruled that a remand was necessary to decide the 
defendant's Batson challenge. In all three cases the trial court 
completely failed make a record. In State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 
591, 593 (Utah 1988) and Pharris, the trial court refused to 
require the prosecutor to even respond to the defendant's Batson 
challenge. 846 P.2d at 458. Consequently, there was no record 
for the appellate court to review. And in State v. Span, 819 
P.2d 329, 336-37 (Utah 1991) the trial court erroneously ruled 
that defendant's motion was untimely. Again, there was no record 
for the court to review.5 
II. APPELLANT ADEQUATELY PRESERVED HIS CLAIM THAT 
THE PROSECUTOR IMPROPERLY COMMENTED ON 
APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO CALL A STATE'S WITNESS. 
The State claims that Appellant failed to preserve his 
claim that the prosecutor improperly shifted the burden of proof 
5
. The court in Span also remanded for a determination of 
whether the stricken juror was a member of a cognizable minority 
group. 819 P.2d at 336-37. 
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to the defense when he claimed at closing arguments that 
Appellant should have called a State's witness at trial. See 
State's Brief, pg. 42-47. The State offers a myriad of reasons 
supporting its claim that the issue was not properly preserved in 
the trial court. 
A. Appellant's Objection Was Sufficiently 
Specific To Preserve The Issue On Appeal. 
The State first claims that Bowman did not preserve the 
specific argument that the prosecutor improperly commented on his 
failure to call Mitchell as a witness. See, State's Brief, pg. 
42-44. The purpose of preserving objections is well established: 
The requirement of a specific objection on the 
record ensures that the trial court will 
understand the basis of the objections and have 
an opportunity to correct any errors before the 
case goes to the jury. 
Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 16 (Utah 1988); Utah County v. 
Brown, 672 P.2d 83, 85 (Utah 1983). Counsel must either state a 
specific ground for an objection or the nature of the objection 
must be clear from the context of the question or the testimony. 
State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1222 (Utah 1986). 
In this case, immediately after the prosecutor commented 
on the defendant's failure to call the State's eye witness the 
following discussion took place: 
Defense Counsel: Objection to that, Judge. Of 
course, he's listed as a prosecution witness on 
the police reports, and if I'd have known he 
wasn't going to be here, I would have done that, 
but --
Prosecutor: Well, I'll object to him insinuating 
that I knew he wasn't going to be here. 
14 
The Court: Well, I don't think that's what he 
did. He simply -- Counsel indicated that if you 
wished him to testify, you could have brought 
him; so, I'll overrule the objection. 
R. 281. Looking at the context of defense counsel's objection, 
it is clear that his concern was with the prosecutor's remark 
that Appellant should have called the State's witness himself. 
Counsel noted that the missing witness was a prosecution witness 
and indicated his surprise that the State had failed to call him 
at trial. Counsel was then interrupted by the prosecutor. The 
court's response indicates that he also understood that defense 
counsel believed that the State should not be allowed to comment 
on the defendant's failure to call a prosecution witness. It 
must also be remembered that the trial court understood that the 
objection was being made in the context of both defense counsel's 
and the State's prior closing arguments. 
As long as counsel states the substance of his argument 
he need not say the magic words "missing witness inference" to 
preserve his claim. Such a hypertechnical requirement would not 
be consistent with the policy underlying the requirement that an 
objection be specific enough to enable the trial court to correct 
the error. In this case, the substance of Appellant's argument, 
simply put, is that it is improper for the State to comment on a 
defendant's failure to call a prosecution witness. That is what 
defense counsel said, that is the question the trial court ruled 
upon, and that is the issue presented to this Court on review. 
Also, contrary to the State's assertion, counsel was not 
required to object again when the prosecutor, having received the 
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court's permission to comment on Appellant's failure to call a 
key prosecution witness, repeated his prior remarks. In Gilbert 
v. State, 891 P.2d 228, 231 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995) the court 
reversed the defendant's conviction on the grounds that the 
prosecutor improperly commented on the defendant's failure to 
call a witness. The court noted that the prejudice against the 
defendant was exacerbated by the fact that the prosecutor 
repeated his improper argument after the judge's ruling. Id. 
The court rejected the State's argument that the defendant was 
required to repeat his objection, move for a mistrial, or request 
a curative instruction on the grounds that defense counsel "could 
properly have concluded that further objection would be pointless 
and might only result in drawing additional attention to the 
improper argument." Id. 
The State also argues that defense counsel should have 
filed a pretrial motion to determine whether or not use of the 
missing witness inference would be permissible. See State's 
brief, pg. 46-47, n.30. The record indicates that defense 
counsel had no notice that the State would not call its eye 
witness to the crime at trial and was surprised when it did not. 
R. 281. Under these circumstances it seems unreasonable to 
require counsel to know before trial that a prosecution witness 
will not be present. 
B. Appellant Did Not Invite Error Because His 
Comment On The Prosecutor's Failure To Call A 
Material State's Witness Was Not Improper. 
The State relies on State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 
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1987) for the proposition that defense counsel invited error by 
commenting in closing argument on the State's failure to call 
Mitchell. See, State's brief, pg. 47-49. The State's reliance 
on Tillman is misplaced. In Tillman, the court held that a 
defendant cannot raise an argument before the jury, wait for the 
prosecutor to respond, fail to object to the prosecutor's 
response, and then complain it was improper on appeal. 750 P.2d 
at 561. Tillman's attorney brought up the fact in a death 
penalty case that he would likely be eligible for parole in 
fifteen years if the jury gave him a life sentence. Tillman was 
held to have invited the error when the prosecutor responded in 
kind. Id. at 559-61. | 
This case is different from Tillman because Appellant was 
entitled to argue the missing witness inference, but the State 
was not. This is not the "tit for tat" situation the court faced 
in Tillman. It must be remembered that the missing witness in 
this case was a prosecution witness who had seen the chase and 
had identified Appellant as the driver. The missing witness 
inference is premised on the notion that if a party fails to call 
a witness who is peculiarly within his control, and that witness 
would reasonably be expected to give favorable testimony, it can 
be fairly inferred that the witness was not called because his 
testimony would not have been consistent with that party's 
theory. State v. Smith, 706 P.2d 1052, 1057 (Utah 1985); 
Gilbert, 891 P.2d at 230. 
In this case, the defense could legitimately comment on 
17 
the State's failure to call Mitchell. Mitchell was a prosecution 
witness who could reasonably be expected to testify favorably for 
the State by identifying Appellant as the driver. He was also 
not available to both parties. 
It has been well said that the availability of a 
witness is not to be determined from his mere 
physical presence at the trial or his 
accessibility for the service of a subpoena upon 
him. On the contrary, his availability may well 
depend, among other things, upon his relationship 
to one or the other of the parties, and the 
nature of the testimony that he might be expected 
to give in the light of his previous statements 
or declarations about the facts of the case. 
United States v. Arendale, 444 F.2d 1260, 1266 (5th Cir. 1971). 
In Arendale, for example, the court held that the wife of the 
informant who provided testimony against the defendant in 
exchange for leniency could not reasonably be expected to give 
favorable evidence to the defense and was for that reason 
"unavailable" to the defendant. Id. at 1266. 
Similarly, in this case, Mitchell was a State's witness 
who approached the police claiming that he had seen the chase and 
that Appellant was the driver. R. 152-53, 172. Under the 
missing witness inference, one can fairly conclude that because 
Mitchell was a material prosecution witness, but was not called, 
his testimony would not have been favorable to the State. 
Counsel could also fairly argue that because the State failed to 
call a material eye witness, it had not proved its case beyond a 
reasonable doubt. R. 273. 
In comparison, no logical inference can be drawn from 
Appellant's failure to call a prosecution witness whose testimony 
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would not reasonably be expected to favor the defense. Mitchell 
was not a material witness to Appellant's theory of the defense 
that he was at home during the entire incident. Lastly, it is 
the role of defense counsel to test the evidence and point out 
the holes in the government's case to the jury. When counsel 
made just that argument, the State responded by trying to shift 
the burden of proof back to the defendant by improperly arguing 
the missing witness inference. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, and Appellant's Opening Brief, 
Appellant respectfully requests this Court reverse his conviction 
and remand the case to the trial court with orders for a new 
trial. 
SUBMITTED this / 2 ^ day of May, 1997. 
t^^ L ^ ^ 
REBECCA C. HYDE 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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